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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT KELTON BERRY, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20040142-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Stephen L. Roth presiding. 
This Court has pour-over jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did trial counsel diminish the State's burden of proof by arguing that the 
jury's decision was "as important, if not more important, than deciding who you are 
going to marry or if you are going to buy a house"? 
Standard of review. When a claim of ineffective assistance is raised for the first 
time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review. Ambiguities or deficiencies 
in the record will be construed in favor of finding that counsel performed 
effectively. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 17,12 P.3d 92. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by instructing the jury to base its 
verdict only on "testimony and other evidence presented in court" and not on 
gestures or facial expressions of courtroom spectators? 
Standard of review. ''Trial courts have the discretion to determine whether a 
curative instruction is required in a particular case." State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 
925 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This case does not require interpreting any statutory or constitutional provision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Amended Information dated 10 June 2003 with 
one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), with a firearms enhancement pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004). R. 18-20. Following a mistrial, a redrawn jury found 
defendant guilty as charged. R. 153,207-09. Defendant was sentenced to six years 
to life and restitution. R. 228. He timely appealed. R. 231. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kneeling in a corner of a deserted and dimly lit industrial area, 19-year-old 
Brandan Booth felt cold steel on the back of his head. R. 266:85,94-95,103-04. It felt 
like a gun. R. 266:130. One of his assailants said, "If you move, you are dead/7 R. 
266:131, see also R. 266:103,105. Brandan thought, "My life [is] over." R. 266:103. 
Earlier that day, 12 March 2003, Brandan had been cleaning out his dad's 
camper trailer. R. 266: 85. Afterwards he was going to his mom's place, walking 
south on 3500 South towards a bus stop on 900 West in Salt Lake County. R. 266:85-
86; R. 267: 220. He was carrying his CD's, CD player, razor, toothbrush, and $15. 
R. 266: 86-87. After waiting at the bus stop for awhile, he concluded that the buses 
were no longer running and decided to walk. R. 266: 86. It was pretty cold and 
getting dark; he was wearing a hoodie. Id. 
As he walked along, a white Hyundai with Idaho plates made a "U" turn, 
stopping beside him. R. 266:87-88,116. The passenger rolled down his window and 
asked Brandan where he was going. R. 266: 87-88. Brandan thought (mistakenly) 
that he recognized the driver from Job Corps or school or somewhere. R. 266: 87. 
(Brandan later realized that he did not know him. R. 266: 89.) Brandan answered, 
"To the bus stop on 35th." R. 266: 88. They offered him a ride, which he accepted. 
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Id. The driver was defendant; the passenger was defendant's brother Karl. R. 266: 
90-91; 118. 
Brandan sat in the back seat. Because the seat was folded down to 
accommodate a bumper, he had to sit kind of "[c]runched up" on the folded seats. 
R. 266: 89. One of the two men said, "We have to make a stop at the mall, and we 
can drop you off there." Id. They seemed nice, although Brandan later reflected, "I 
guess I should have been concerned at that point." R. 266: 90. 
"My life is over" 
At Valley Fair Mall, Karl returned a pair of pants at J.C. Penney, leaving 
Brandan alone with defendant in the car. R. 266: 90-92. Defendant was friendly. R. 
266: 107. He complained that he was "sick of giving [Karl] rides," acting "like a 
chauffeur." R. 266: 91. By the time Karl returned, the buses had left the mall; 
defendant and Karl offered to drive Brandan to Magna. R. 266: 92-93. Their first 
stop was McDonald's. R. 266: 93. They asked Brandan if he wanted anything, and 
when he declined they bought him an ice cream anyway. Id. 
Defendant drove west from McDonald's, then turned down a street in an 
industrial area. Id. When Brandan asked where they were going, they responded, 
"We are going to a friend's. We have to stop at a friend's real quick." Id. They 
drove to an industrial area, where Karl got out and vomited. Id. Brandan thought 
he might have been drunk. R. 266: 94. 
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About three minutes later Karl got back into the car. Id. Defendant looked back 
and said, "I think we need to adjust your seat/' Id. He then parked the car behind 
some warehouses. Id. It was dark; the only light came from a dim light above the 
door of a nearby loading dock. R. 266:95. No cars or people were around. Id. They 
all got out of the car. Id. Defendant started adjusting the rear seat. R. 266: 96. 
As Brandan was watching, Karl "came up and socked [him]" on the right cheek. 
Id. It was a forceful blow. Id. Brandan started to put his fists up to defend himself, 
but Karl pulled out a knife. R. 266: 97. It was about two inches long. Id. He held 
it to Brandan's chest, then to his throat. R. 266:97-98. He said, "What do you have? 
Give me all your stuff." R. 266: 98. Brandan thought, "My life is over." R. 266: 99. 
Brandan gave Karl his CD player, his wallet, his bag containing his razor and 
toothbrush, "everything [he] had." R. 266:99,127,148. His CD's were still in the car. 
R. 266: 99. Karl looked through the wallet, removed the money, and threw the 
wallet back at Brandan. Id. Brandan had about 200 CD's. R. 266:100. Karl wanted 
to give them back to him, but defendant looked through them and said, "I am 
keeping these." Id. They returned his toiletries kit, but kept the razor. R. 266:148. 
They told Brandan to take his clothes off. R. 266:100. He started to remove his 
sweater, but defendant stopped him and said something like, "We got to go." R. 
266:132. One of the brothers, probably Karl, told him to " [g]o get in the corner" and 
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kneel down. R. 266:101-02,129. Karl said to defendant, "Get the gun. Get the gun." 
R. 266:101. Brandan saw defendant reaching under the car seat, apparently for the 
gun. R. 266: 99,104. Brandan "thought for sure [his] life was over." R. 266:103. 
On his knees, in the corner, Brandan felt cold steel on the back of his head. R. 
266:103-04. It felt like a gun; he assumed it was a gun. R. 266:130. One of them 
said, "If you move, you are dead." R. 266:131, see also R. 266:103,105. Then they 
drove off, throwing a dollar bill out of the car window for the bus. R. 266:105-06, 
128. Brandan got up and looked at the license plate of the car. R. 266:105. Brandan 
started walking. He "was crying, couldn't breathe, was trying to find somebody." 
R. 266:106. He "was in shock." R. 266: 111. 
"I never seen nobody that scared before ever in my life" 
Security guard John Maez saw him. R. 267: 168. Brandan was veering off, 
swaying, staggering, "looking just lost." R. 267: 168-69. Maez thought he was 
drunk. R. 267:168. When Brandan got closer, Maez could see he was hurt. R. 267: 
169. The side of his face was bruised and bleeding, he was crying, and he was 
having trouble breathing. Id, He was so afraid that he opened the door of Maez's 
vehicle and "just jumped right in" and proceeded to tell Maez what had happened 
to him. Id. The first thing out of his mouth was a request to "get him out of the 
area." R. 267:170. He said, "They are going to kill me." Id. Maez of fered to get him 
medical help, but Brandan asked, "Can you please get me out of the area?" Id. He 
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kept saying, "Please, please, get me out of here. Get me out of here/7 R. 267:171. 
Maez had "never seen nobody that scared before ever in my life/7 R. 267:172. Maez 
called 911. Id. 
When Officer Mike Christenson arrived, Brandan "was very upset, shaking, 
crying, having a hard time talking and breathing." R. 267:190,194. He said he had 
just been robbed. R. 267:194. He described the crime in detail. R. 267: 210-12. He 
described his two assailants and said their car had a bumper in the back seat and 
smelled like gasoline . R. 267: 199, 203-04, 208-09. An "attempt to locate" was 
broadcast over police dispatch. R. 267: 206. The vehicle was described as a white 
Hyundai with Idaho plates with two male occupants. R. 267: 234. 
Officer Robert Cowan responded. R. 267: 206, 233. Officer Cowan drove to 
Officer Christenson7s location and told him about a traffic stop he had made earlier 
in the day. R. 267: 235. He had stopped a white Hyundai with Idaho license plates 
for speeding. R. 267: 232. The car was occupied by a driver and a front seat 
passenger. R. 267:233,235. Officer Cowan noticed a large bumper protruding from 
the trunk into the back seat, where the seats were folded down. R. 267:234. He also 
smelled a strong odor of gasoline. Id. Cowan requested Christenson to ask the 
victim about the smell and the auto part in the back seat. R. 267: 235. Christenson 
responded that the victim had told him the same thing. Id. 
7 
Officer Frank Johnson also went to the location where Brandan was being 
interviewed. R. 267:241-42. Brandan had by then calmed down and was talking to 
the officers. R. 267:242. Officer Johnson got defendant's name and interviewed him 
over the telephone. R. 267: 247, 263. 
"I was actually being a good Samaritan" 
In the telephone interview with Officer Johnson, defendant claimed that Karl 
had robbed Brandan. R. 267:251. He stated that, after Brandan got in the car, Karl 
sent him a telephone text message saying, "[P]ull over just right at the next light, 
. . . I want to jack him." R. 267: 259. 
When asked whether he had pointed something at Brandan's head to make him 
think he had a gun, defendant replied, "No. I did not. I told the kid, I says, I didn't 
want, I honestly didn't want my license plate [reported], and I told the kid, I says 
just turn and face the wall, I says don't turn around." R. 267: 253. Defendant 
admitted saying, "[W]hatever you do, do not turn around. My brother's like, you 
know, and then that's when we drove away." R. 267: 253. He said that Karl "said 
don't turn around or he was going to shoot him or something like that." R. 267:254. 
Defendant denied that either of them had a gun, but he acknowledged that Karl 
had put a knife to Brandan's throat. Id. "I had nothing to do with it," defendant 
claimed. "I was totally against it." R. 267:256. In fact, he said, "I was actually being 
a good Samaritan, giving someone a ride home." R. 267: 252. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective when she argued 
that the jury's decision was "as important, if not more important, than deciding who 
you are going to marry or if you are going to buy a house." R. 267: 294. 
Defendant's claim fails because it is premised on the Robertson test, which the 
supreme court rejected in State v. Reyes and State v. Cruz. It also fails because 
counsel complied with Robertson. She did not equate the jury's decision to making 
major life decisions, but said it was more important because it was irrevocable. 
Defendant also fails to demonstrate prejudice. There is no likelihood that, but 
for counsel's argument, the jury would have believed defendant's claim that he was 
"actually being a good Samaritan" over Brandan's compelling testimony. 
2. Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in responding to a 
juror's claim to have seen a spectator prompting Brandan on the witness stand. 
However, the court's response to the incident was textbook: it excluded the alleged 
coaches, instructed the jury to base their verdict solely on the evidence, and 
permitted defense counsel to cross-examine Brandan about the alleged prompting. 
Defendant's request to query the other jurors about the alleged prompting was 
pointless. The only possible effect of seeing the prompting was to bias a juror 
against the prosecution, not against the defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Defendant's original brief argued three issues. Two were affected by the 
supreme court's decision in State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305, issued after 
defendant's opening brief was filed. This Court invited defendant to file a 
supplemental brief "addressing the effect of State v. Reyes!' Order of 14 June 2005. 
Defendant filed a supplemental brief addressing one sub-argument in defendant's 
original brief. 
Defendant's original point I centers on the principle of reasonable doubt. 
Point LA argues that the reasonable doubt instruction violated due process by 
failing to instruct the jury that the State must obviate all reasonable doubt. Br. Aplt. 
at 19-23. This argument was rejected in Reyes, 2005 UT 33, \ 30 and State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45, \ 21,530 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 ("the Robertson test is no longer in force"). 
In defendant's supplemental brief, he does not mention this claim as having 
survived Reyes. Supp. Br. Aplt. at 6. The State agrees that this claim did not survive 
Reyes and accordingly will not address it. 
Point LB contains two sub-points. The first sub-point argues that defense 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise Robertson objections. This sub-point rests 
upon the claims asserted in Point LA In defendant's supplemental brief, he does not 
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mention this claim as having survived Reyes. Supp. Br. Aplt. at 6. The State agrees 
that this claim also did not survive Reyes and accordingly will not address it. 
The second sub-point of defendant's original point LB argues that defense 
counsel was ineffective for comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions in 
closing argument. Br. Aplt. at 25. Defendant asserts that this claim is unaffected by 
Reyes. Supp. Br. Aplt. at 6. Accordingly, the State will respond to this argument. 
This will be the State's Point I. 
Defendant's original point II argues that the trial judge erred by not instructing 
the jury on the law at the close of the evidence. Br. Aplt. at 28. This argument was 
rejected in Reyes, 2005 UT 33, If 49 and Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 27. In defendant's 
supplemental brief, he does not mention this claim as having survived Reyes. Supp. 
Br. Aplt. at 6. The State agrees that this claim did not survive Reyes and accordingly 
will not address it. 
Defendant's point III argues that the trial judge erroneously limited the jurors' 
ability to determine credibility and failed to ensure that the jurors were impartial. 
Br. Aplt. at 41. This claim is wholly unaffected by Reyes. Accordingly, the State will 
respond to this argument. This will be the State's Point II. 
In sum, point I of this brief will respond to the second sub-point of defendant's 
original point LB, as expanded in defendant's supplemental brief. Point II of this 
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brief will respond to defendant's original point III, found only in defendant's 
original opening brief. This brief will not respond to point LA, the first sub-point 
of point LB, or point II of defendant's original opening brief. 
Defendant's supplemental brief is not explicit as to which claims or portions 
of claims defendant continues to assert post-Reyes. To the extent the State has 
misread defendant's intentions with respect to a particular claim, it requests leave 
to file a supplemental brief. 
I 
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT DIMINISH THE STATE'S BURDEN 
OF PROOF BY ARGUING THAT THE JURY'S DECISION WAS "AS 
IMPORTANT, IF NOT MORE IMPORTANT, THAN DECIDING 
WHO YOU ARE GOING TO MARRY OR IF YOU ARE GOING TO 
BUY A HOUSE" 
Defendant claims that " defense counsel was ineffective for comparing a 
reasonable doubt to major life decisions." Supp. Br. Aplt. at 6 (boldface and 
capitalization omitted). He argues that trial counsel's closing ran afoul of the second 
Robertson factor, which he contends survived Reyes. Id. 
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel faces a "difficult 
burden." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,1259 (Utah 1993). First, he must demonstrate 
that his counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997). Second, he must 
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demonstrate that his counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial, in that it 
affected the outcome of the case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692. 
When reviewing counsel's performance, "a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 685 (quoting Strickland 466 U.S. at 689). 
"If a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated, [the court] will 
assume counsel acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah App. 
1993). Thus, "an ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable 
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id. 
To satisfy the prejudice requirement, a defendant must show "that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "If 
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice . . . that course should be followed." Id. at 697. 
"Given the arduous nature of the defendant's burden, ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims rarely succeed." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351,354 (Utah App. 1993). 
A, Reyes and Cruz overruled the entire Robertson test. 
Defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails because its premise is false: 
Robertson's second prong did not survive Reyes and Cruz. 
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Relying heavily upon Justice Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1989), Robertson adopted a three-part test for evaluating reasonable doubt 
instructions: 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must 
obviate all reasonable doubt/7 Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). Second, the instruction should not state that a reasonable 
doubt is one which "would govern or control a person in the more 
weighty affairs of life/7 as such an instruction tends to trivialize the 
decision of whether to convict. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Third, "it is 
inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a 
possibility/7 although it is permissible to instruct that a "fanciful or wholly 
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.77 Id. at 1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1232 (Utah 1997). 
Although Reyes and Cruz involved only the first and third prongs of this test, 
in both cases the supreme court repudiated the entire test. Thus, in Cruz, the court 
stated, "In State v. Reyes . . . the State also urged us to overrule Robertson. We 
accepted that invitation, and pursuant to our opinion in Reyes, the Robertson test is 
no longer in force/7 Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 21. In its place, the court adopted the test 
articulated in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994): "Simply put, we need only ask 
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of 
reasonable doubt . . / ' Id. 
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument fails because it is 
premised on the second prong of an abandoned test. 
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B. Defense counsel's closing argument did not diminish the State's 
burden of proof. 
Defendant does not contend that counsel's argument violated the Victor test. 
However, even if the second prong of the Robertson test were still in effect, defendant 
could not demonstrate his trial counsel was ineffective. Counsel did not equate 
reasonable doubt to major life decisions, but argued that the decision to convict was 
irrevocable and therefore "as important, if not more important/' than major life 
decisions. R. 267: 294 (emphasis added). 
Robertson stated that a reasonable doubt instruction "should not state that a 
reasonable doubt is one which 'would govern or control a person in the more 
weighty affairs of life/ as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision of 
whether to convict." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (quoting Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 
(Stewart, J., dissenting)). However, a jury instruction that "impress[es] upon the 
jurors that the reasonable doubt standard requires greater proof than such decisions" 
was proper even under the Robertson standard. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 356 
(Utah 1993). 
This is precisely what defense counsel did here. In closing, she first 
emphasized that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is the highest standard of proof 
known to our legal system: 
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Now, ladies and gentlemen, I told you in opening that I would talk 
about beyond a reasonable doubt. And that's a very, very high standard 
in our justice system. It is the highest standard of proof that there is. 
And there are several standards of proof. One is by the preponderance of 
the evidence. And that's in a civil case. And the jury can find for, say, like 
a plaintiff, if they have shown by the preponderance of the evidence 
whatever they are trying to prove. 
A higher standard is clear and convincing evidence. That's even a 
higher standard. 
And, ladies and gentlemen, if you find that the State has proven this 
case by a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the State has 
proven its case by clear and convincing evidence, your verdict must be not 
guilty, because that is not high enough. Beyond a reasonable doubt is 
higher than that. If you think that he maybe committed an aggravated 
robbery or a robbery, your verdict must be not guilty. If you think that he 
probably committed a robbery or an aggravated robbery, your verdict 
must still be not guilty. That is how high the standard of proof is in this 
case. 
R. 267: 293-94 (addendum A). After impressing upon the jury the difficulty of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, counsel stated that the decision before 
them was as important, if not more important, than deciding who to marry or what 
house to buy: 
And I have talked about how serious these offenses are, and how 
important this decision is that you are making today. It is as important, if 
not more important, than deciding who you are going to marry or if you 
are going to buy a house. That's how careful you have to be and what 
factors you would weigh in saying, "Am I going to marry this person?" 
And the thing is, in a case like that, with buying a house or marrying 
somebody, you can change that decision. You can get a divorce. You can 
sell your house. But in this case you cannot. 
R. 267: 294 (emphasis added) (addendum A). 
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Far from equating the decision to convict with the decision to marry or buy a 
house, defense counsel explained that because they could not later undo an error, 
they must be more certain of their verdict than they would be when deciding to 
marry or buy a house. Whether consciously or not, counsel was paraphrasing a line 
from Justice Stewart's Tillman dissent: "Human error in making 'weighty and 
important7 decisions in the conduct of one's personal life is common, as shown, for 
example, by the high divorce rate and large numbers of bankruptcies. Of course, 
many of those decisions can be corrected, unlike the irreversible decision to 
execute." Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 230 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
In sum, counsel stressed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "a very, very 
high standard/7 in fact "the highest standard of proof that there is." R. 267:293. She 
stressed that the jurors had better be sure about their verdict, because they could not 
change it later. R. 267:294. She thus "impressed upon the jurors that the reasonable 
doubt standard requires greater proof than such decisions," a proper statement of the 
law even under the Robertson standard. Young, 853 P.2d at 356. Her argument was 
thus entirely reasonable. 
Moreover, even if counsel's performance were deficient, defendant has failed 
to demonstrate "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Defendant's prejudice argument rests on supposed inconsistencies in Brandan's 
testimony concerning who took his CD's. Defendant cites six times to the transcript 
of the preliminary hearing and once to the transcript of the first trial, which ended 
in a mistrial. See Supp. Br. Aplt. at 12. Of course, these transcripts were not before 
the jury at trial, and so had no effect on the verdict. They are therefore not relevant 
to the question of prejudice or any other question on appeal. However, even the 
passages from those irrelevant transcripts, read together with the relevant trial 
transcript, demonstrate that Brandan consistently maintained that, however Karl 
and defendant obtained possession of his CD's, it was defendant who refused to 
return them. Id, at 11-13; R. 266: 99-100,135. For example, when asked on cross-
examination whether it was not defendant who said, "Give the CD's back," Brandan 
stood firm: "No, it wasn't. He was the one who took them." R. 266:135. In other 
words, like his younger brother Karl, defendant was an active participant in this 
crime. 
Moreover, defendant's own story —adduced at trial by the prosecution-
confirmed his guilt. He admitted driving Brandan to a secluded location after 
receiving Karl's text message, "[P]ull over just right at the next light,. . . I want to 
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jack him." R. 267:259. Thus, even if it was Karl who brandished the knife, touched 
the back of Brandan's head with a gun (or a facsimile, its legal equivalent), and took 
physical possession of the CD's, defendant was equally guilty of the crime. "Every 
person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense . . . 
who. . . intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-202 (West 2004). The jury was instructed on this principle. See R. 195. 
But regardless of such subtleties, this case was not close. Brandan had no 
motive to falsely implicate defendant; defendant had every motive to falsely shift 
blame to Karl. Brandan gave a detailed, consistent account, tested under cross-
examination. Defendant's telephone statement to police confirmed most of 
Brandan's account. It differed only in that defendant claimed that his brother Karl 
was the criminal, whereas he was "actually being a good Samaritan/7 R. 267: 252. 
The jury was out less than an hour. See R. 267: 302. 
On these facts, there is no likelihood that the jury convicted defendant because 
defense counsel argued that their decision was "as important, if not more 
important" than the decision to marry or buy a house. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO BASE ITS VERDICT ONLY ON 
"TESTIMONY AND OTHER EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN COURT" 
Defendant claims that the trial court deprived him of "a fair trial when he 
misinformed the jurors not to consider Brandan's mother's coaching for any 
purpose, including determining Brandan's credibility/7 Br. Aplt. at 41. He also 
contends that "[t]he trial judge further abused his discretion in failing to grant 
defense counsel's request to interview all the jurors for possible bias/7 Br. Aplt. at 
47. 
Proceedings below. At one point during Brandan's cross-examination, juror 
Ryan interrupted the proceedings and asked to speak to the court. R. 266: 136 
(addendum B, which includes R. 266:136-45). The court cleared the courtroom, then 
directed the juror to make a written statement and give it to the bailiff. Id. The 
statement read: "The lady in the audience is prompting the witness with head 
shakes the last ten minutes/7 R. 266:137. 
The judge said that he had not been watching the audience. Id. Defense 
counsel stated, "I haven't noticed anything. And that's always my concern when we 
get other people in the courtroom. I just wish the State would make me a decent 
offer in this case, and we could end it." Id. The court ordered the victim's mother 
and the victim coordinator to return to the courtroom. Id. Both stated they had not 
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prompted Brandan on the stand, and the victim coordinator stated that she had not 
been observing the mother, but watching Brandan testify. R. 266:137-38. 
The court then asked both women to leave. "I am not sure what happened 
here. But I don't believe that you should be in the audience at this point, because an 
issue has been raised." R. 266:138. The judge stated that he was "not making any 
accusations at all. But I want to make sure this trial goes on with as little problem 
as can be possible." Id. 
Defense counsel then requested that the other jurors be questioned concerning 
what they saw or did not see. Id. She asserted "a right to mention what happened 
in the courtroom, and it appeared that someone was prompting Brandan." R. 266: 
139. The court ordered that defense counsel could not comment on anything the 
juror said. Id. Defense counsel then expressed a preference "to ask them if they 
noticed anything. They may not. And then just do a general instruction that they 
are not to take that into consideration. And I think that would cure it." R. 266:140. 
The court was "not inclined to further emphasize the process by going through and 
talking to individual jurors, especially when I believe that the issue can be cured 
with an instruction." R. 266:141. 
Defense counsel suggested a wording change in the court's draft instruction, 
which the court adopted. R. 266:142. She then complained that "you are telling the 
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juror to disregard what he saw, and he can't give any weight to what she was 
saying." Id. The court responded that counsel could cross-examine the witness 
about it; counsel responded, "Okay. He will say no." Id. The court replied, "The 
issue here really is both the effect of this alleged activity on the witness—we don't 
know whether it happened or not— and on the juror. And I think that it can—that 
you can deal with that issue in that way." Id. 
Defense counsel responded, "Why don't we just forget the instruction, and that 
will just be my question." R. 266:143. Over the prosecutor's objection, the court 
decided not to give the instruction "at this point." Id. But it expressed an intent to 
instruct the jury that they "are to accept as evidence and rely on in their 
deliberations only testimony or other evidence presented in court. They may not 
consider gestures, facial expressions, or other demonstrations by anyone else 
present in the courtroom." R. 266:144. Defense counsel then expressed a concern 
that "this juror should be able to consider that. I don't think he should be instructed 
to disregard what he saw as prompting." Id. The court ruled, "I will allow you to 
cross examine the witness, subject to objection, about whether he was prompted by 
anybody in the courtroom I don't think he can rely on anything she did there. 
She is not a witness . . ." Id. 
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The trial proceeded with the victim's mother and the victim coordinator outside 
the courtroom. See R. 266:145. The judge instructed the jury that "[j]urors are to 
accept as evidence and rely on in their deliberations only testimony and other 
evidence presented and accepted in court. They may not consider gestures, facial 
expressions, or any other demonstrations by any other person present in the 
courtroom/' R. 266:145-46. Defense counsel then resumed her cross-examination 
of Brandan Booth: 
Q Brandan, before we just took a break, there were two other 
people in the courtroom; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And now they are not here anymore? 
A No. 
Q When I was asking you questions about this case, did you see 
anybody make gestures towards you? 
A No. 
Q You didn't see anybody prompting you to say a certain answer 
in a certain way? 
A What's prompting? Telling me to say something? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Anybody nodding? 
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A No. 
Q Trying to alter your testimony? 
A I was looking at you. 
R. 266:146. 
Standard of review. "Trial courts have the discretion to determine whether a 
curative instruction is required in a particular case." State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 
925 (Utah App. 1990). 
Precedent. "It is axiomatic that a defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial 
trial based on the evidence presented to the jury, without the jury being influenced 
by information from outside sources." State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1263 (Utah 
1983). Consequently, a jury's verdict must be "based on the evidence and the law 
presented to it." State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81,85 (Utah 1988) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
"Verdicts decided on some other basis make the constitutionally guaranteed right 
to trial by jury a nullity." Id. 
The United States Supreme Court has similarly held that a jury's verdict must 
"be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources." Sheppard 
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966). Indeed, a conviction may be set aside where 
jurors are exposed to "information that was not admitted at trial." Id. (citing 
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959)). 
24 
In State v. Pearson, 943 R2d 1347 (Utah 1997), our supreme court held that the 
prosecutor's remarks in closing were improper because they "called the jury's 
attention to facts outside the evidence." Id. at 1352. Nevertheless, the action did not 
prejudice the outcome of the case because the court had instructed the jurors that the 
arguments of counsel were not evidence and that "they were to rely only on the 
evidence in reaching factual conclusions." Id. at 1353. 
Prompting presents a special case. "When the trial court's attention is drawn 
to the fact that a witness is being coached by a spectator at the trial, the trial court 
has a duty to take curative action." State v. Rodriquez, 509 N.W.2d 1,3-4 (Neb. 1993). 
"Ordinarily, permitting the issue to be raised on cross-examination will constitute 
an effective cure." Id. at 4. Alternatively, "admonition to the coach may be 
sufficient." Id. (citing Evers v. State, 121 N.W. 1005 (1909), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Brockman, 168 N.W.2d 367 (1969)); cf. Commonwealth v. Toon, 773 N.E.2d 
993,1006-07 (Mass. App. 2002). Excluding the purported coach and instructing the 
jury not to let the court's admonition and exclusion of the spectator "affect the 
credibility of the witness in this case" will also suffice. United States v. Tolliver, 61 
F.3d 1189,1208 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds by Sterling v. United States, 516 
U.S. 1105 (1996). Where a spectator may have engaged in disruptive behavior, the 
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trial court may appropriately instruct the jurors to be "governed solely by the 
evidence." State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 935 (Utah App. 1991). 
Defendant cites no case, and the States is aware of none, holding that the 
appropriate response to a coaching incident is to instruct the jury that they may 
consider facts not admitted into evidence. 
People v. Smith, 624 N.E.2d 836 (111. App. 1993), bears sufficient similarity to the 
case at bar to be instructive. Smith appealed her conviction for arson of the Kopy 
Kat Restaurant. Id. at 838. Aimee Manis, a waitress at the Kopy Kat, was a witness 
for the prosecution. Id. at 844. An alternate juror reported to the bailiff that the 
witness's mother had on several occasions mouthed the words "I don't know" while 
her daughter was testifying. Id. 
The judge interviewed the juror with counsel present in the jury room. The 
juror stated that she had mentioned the incident to other jurors, whom the judge 
also interviewed. None of the others had observed anything. Id. The judge 
interviewed the witness, who denied that her testimony was being directed by her 
mother. The witness's mother also denied trying to communicate with her. Id. The 
judge denied the defendant's mistrial motion but ordered the mother to leave the 
courtroom during her daughter's testimony. Id. 
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After surveying several precedents, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the 
trial court's handling of the alleged coaching incident was reasonable and "well 
within its discretion." Id. at 845. The court noted that this was not "an incident of 
obvious coaching," as "only one alternate juror claims to have noticed the incident" 
and the witness and her mother "both claimed they were not attempting to 
communicate during testimony." Id. In fact, the court concluded," [t]he most logical 
effect of this incident was to impeach Manis and weaken the State's case, as Manis 
was a prosecution witness." Id. 
Analysis, Smith provides a useful guide here. The incidents were similar: as 
in Smith, the instant case involves a juror who claimed to have seen a coaching 
incident and a witness and a mother who denied it. In Smith, the only curative 
action taken by the court was to exclude the purported coach. Here, the court 
excluded the purported coaches and invited defendant to cross-examine the witness 
about the purported coaching. This latter action alone, according to Rodriquez, 509 
N.W.2d at 4 , will "[o]rdinarily, constitute an effective cure." In addition, as 
approved in Tolliver, 61 F.3d at 1208, the trial court gave a curative instruction. The 
court, however, was "not inclined to further emphasize the process by going 
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through and talking to individual jurors, especially when I believe that the issue can 
be cured with an instruction/7 R. 266:141.1 
Defendant compares the court's curative instruction to the judge's improper 
comment in Rodriguez. See Br. Aplt. at 46. The comparison is inapt. 
In Rodgriguez, the trial court "allowed the defense to make a factual issue of the 
matter, permitting five defense witnesses to testify before the jury that they had seen 
[a detective] coaching [a prosecution witness] on the stand." Rodriguez, 509 N. W.2d 
at 3. Nevertheless, the judge's own conduct "amounted] to testimony from the 
bench." Id. at 4. "Speaking directly to these issues, the trial judge stated that he had 
been watching [the detective] and that [the detective] had not coached [the 
witness]." Id. "In relaying this information," the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled, 
"the trial judge assumed the role of a witness." Id. 
Nothing similar occurred here. The trial court merely gave a legally 
unassailable curative instruction to the jury: "Jurors are to accept as evidence and 
rely on in their deliberations only testimony and other evidence presented and 
accepted in court. They may not consider gestures, facial expressions, or any other 
demonstration by any other person present in the courtroom." R. 266:145-46. The 
1
 Defendant does not challenge the trial court's sua sponte announcement that 
it was "not going to make a juror a witness here. That's just not going to happen." 
R. 266:139. 
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court expressed no opinion as to whether coaching had occurred. If anything, the 
exclusion of Brandan's mother and the victim coordinator from the courtroom, 
coupled with defense counsel's cross-examination of Brandan concerning coaching, 
left the impression that coaching may well have occurred. R. 266:146. 
This was of course defendant's goal. As in Smith, "[t]he most logical effect of 
this incident was to impeach [Brandan] and weaken the State's case, as [Brandan] 
was a prosecution witness/' Smith, 624 N.E.2d at 845. Evidence that Brandan was 
merely parroting the views of his mother, who knew nothing of the incident, could 
only have eroded his credibility. Consequently, any "bias" resulting from this event 
ran in defendant's favor. There is some potential for prejudice against a defendant 
where jurors suspect that he is involved in prompting. See State v. Tueller, 2001 UT 
App 317, Iffl 12-13,37 P.3d 1180 (finding no prejudice). But there is no potential for 
prejudice against a defendant where jurors suspect that a prosecution witness is 
involved in prompting. 
Defendant's preferred solution of permitting the jury to consider matters not 
admitted into evidence is the one obviously wrong choice. All cases agree that the 
jury's verdict must be "based on evidence received in open court, not from outside 
sources." Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351. He cites no contrary authority. 
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Defendant's complaint that the court failed to interview other jurors rings 
equally hollow. It is true enough that "the only way to determine if any other jurors 
had seen the coaching and were biased by it was to question the jurors themselves." 
Br. Aplt. at 47. But whether other jurors had seen the coaching was irrelevant. One 
biased juror would have required a mistrial. Juror Ryan had or claimed to have 
"seen the coaching," yet defendant did not move for a mistrial; he merely asked 
whether the court was going to question "the other jurors," R. 266: 139. But 
interviewing the other jurors "just to ask them if they noticed anything," which is 
what defense counsel wanted, would have added nothing. R. 266:140. Defendant 
does not explain how increasing the number of jurors known to have seen the 
purported prompting would change anything.2 
Finally, defendant argues that "improper contacts between jurors and 
interested parties support the need for an evidentiary hearing." Br. Aplt. at 47 
(citing State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277,281 (Utah 1985)). 
There were no improper contacts here. Seeing a person across the room is not 
an "improper contact." If it were, a juror seeing a defendant seated at counsel table 
or a witness in the gallery would raise "a rebuttable presumption of prejudice." 
2
 From the defense perspective, one tactical objective for interviewing the 
other jurors would have been to inform them of the coaching allegation, since that 
information could only harm the State's case. Cross-examining Brandan achieved 
this objective. 
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State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35,18,116 P.3d 317 (quoting Pike, 712 P.2d at 280). "Contact" 
in this context typically refers to a "conversation in the hall," or other "brief 
conversation." Piker 712 P.2d at 280; Shipp, 2005 UT 35, \ 2. Any such conversation 
that amounts to "more than a brief, incidental contact" risks "breeding a sense of 
familiarity that could clearly affect the jurors ['] judgment as to credibility." Pike, 712 
P.2d at 281. Merely viewing someone across the courtroom, like overhearing a 
bailiff yell "they are guilty," is not "the type of contact which raises a presumption 
of prejudice." State v. Hale, 2000 UT App 297, \ 1 (unpublished) (copy attached at 
addendum C in compliance with Utah R. App.P. 30(f)). 
In any event, defendant never claimed below that the juror's view of the alleged 
coaching constituted a Pike contact, nor did he seek an evidentiary hearing or move 
for a mistrial. See R. 266:136-45. On the contrary, defense counsel stated that "the 
only concern is I think this juror should be able to consider that. I don't think he 
should be instructed to disregard what he saw as prompting." R. 266:144. This 
demonstrates that his tactical objective at trial was to maximize, not minimize, the 
effect of this "contact." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process/' Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, f 10,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560 (Cal. 
1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral 
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _j__ October 2005. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
ERICVOROSJR. 
sistant Attorney General 
ief, Appeals Division 
32 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that this J2_ October 2005, 7 copies of the foregoing brief of 
appellee were • hand-delivered to an agent of ^ m a i l e d to the following: 
JOAN C WATT 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellant 
4 ^ ~ Y\jJOUr^yU^ 
33 
Addenda 
Addendum A 
A r l / ^ A t % / ^ i i - i v » A 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 
ROBERT 
OF UTAH, 
vs 
KELTON 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
BERRY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. 031100783 
Transcript of: 
JURY TRIAL 
VOLUME II 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
ay-
M A Y - 5 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. ROTH 
3636 Constitution Blvd. 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
DECEMBER 10, 2003 
REPORTED BY: BRAD YOUNG 
238-7531 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 16 2004 
I 
00(7267 
1 I what's going on. He wouldnrt have wasted his time to fix the 
2 J seat. There would be no reason to do it. 
3 I Now, the State is trying to suggest that the — the 
4 I victim is trying to suggest that the victim was taken on a wild 
5 I goose chase here. And that just is not true. Again, he was in 
6 the car for a long period of time. And if you are going up to 
7 Bangerter to go out to Magna, you can cut through there. They 
8 went to the McDonald's which is on 36th West. You go north 
9 there. You run into the residential areas. And there are 
10 several streets that head up to Bangerter. The only reason 
11 they pulled over in that area was, number one, first, Karl had 
12 to throw up, if you remember that. He got sick and he got out. 
13 He threw up. Then they get back in. Then they have to adjust 
14 the seat, because the guy was uncomfortable. He mentions that. 
15 He says that his feet were scrunched up and it was very 
16 uncomfortable. And that is why they pulled over, not to pull 
17 over into some secluded area to rob him. 
18 Now, ladies and gentlemen, I told you in opening that 
19 I would talk about beyond a reasonable doubt. And that's a 
20 very, very high standard in our justice system. It is the 
21 highest standard of proof that there is. And there are several 
22 standards of proof. One is by the preponderance of the 
23 evidence. And that's in a civil case. And the jury can find 
24 for, say, like a plaintiff, if they have shown by the 
25 I preponderance of the evidence whatever they are trying to 
1 prove. 
2 A higher standard is clear and convincing evidence. 
3 Thatfs even a higher standard. 
4 And, ladies and gentlemen, if you find that the State 
5 has proven this case by a preponderance of the evidence, or if 
6 you find that the State has proven its case by clear and 
7 convincing evidence, your verdict must be not guilty, because 
8 that is not high enough. Beyond a reasonable doubt is higher 
9 than that. If you think that he maybe committed an aggravated 
10 robbery or a robbery, your verdict must be not guilty. If you 
11 think that he probably committed a robbery or an aggravated 
12 robbery, your verdict must still be not guilty. That is how 
13 high the standard of proof is in this case. 
14 And I have talked about how serious these offenses 
15 are, and how important this decision is that you are making 
16 today. It is as important, if not more important, than 
17 deciding who you are going to marry or if you are going to buy 
18 a house. Thatfs how careful you have to be and what factors 
19 you would weigh in saying, "Am I going to marry this person?" 
20 And the thing is, in a case like that, with buying a house or 
21 marrying somebody, you can change that decision. You can get a 
22 divorce. You can sell your house. But in this case you 
23 cannot. 
24 And, ladies and gentlemen, I was going over the 
25 transcript last night, and I just gave up counting how many 
1 times the victim said, "I don't know. I!m not sure. I don!t 
2 know. I'm not sure." That is not beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3 He is not sure what happened, so how can you be sure? How can 
4 they ask you to convict him? They have not proven their case 
5 beyond a reasonable doubt, and I ask for two not guilty 
6 verdicts. 
7 Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Gustin-Furgis. 
9 Ms. Peters? 
10 MS. PETERS: Thank you, your Honor. The defendant 
11 did the best he could. So then he drove Brandan to safety. He 
12 was the driver. His brother wanted to jack him. He got a text 
13 message and then he said, "Don't do it." So, of course, the 
14 next step would be to drive Brandan to safety, because he 
15 didn't want it to happen, so he drove Brandan to a bus stop. 
16 No, we didn't hear anything about that. He drove Brandan to a 
17 police station, so he wouldn't get jacked. We didn't hear 
18 anything about that, either. Did he drive Brandan home? No. 
19 Instead, he drove Brandan to a secluded area. When you go back 
20 and deliberate, look at the map. See how many houses you see 
21 on the map. See how many warehouses you see. There is nothing 
22 back there but warehouses. And you heard testimony from John 
23 Maez, who has been a security guard with USANA for six years, 
24 that there is nothing over there except warehouses. I don't 
25 I think that that is a protective area. I don't think the 
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1 A Yeah. 
2 Q That you said was from Robert Berry and his brother? 
3 A Yeah. 
4 Q Then do you remember showing them a cigarette butt? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q And you said that's what Robert had smoked? 
7 A I am not sure who I said smoked it. 
8 Q But you may have said that to the cops? 
9 A I remember saying the cigarette, there was a 
10 cigarette. I think I said one of them smoked or something like 
11 that. 
12 Sorry. 
13 THE COURT: Are you having a little trouble hearing? 
14 JUROR: (Mr. Ryan) No, I need to talk to you, Judge, 
15 and the prosecutor. Or I can tell the bailiff. 
16 THE COURT: No, let!s hold on at this point. Let!s 
17 take a break, and we will have the jury taken out, and then you 
18 can speak briefly to the bailiff. Why donft you write down 
19 what you want me to know, and give it to the bailiff, and he 
20 will bring it in to me. All right? Let's have the jury go 
21 out. If you will do that without the other jurors seeing what 
22 you are writing. 
23 (A brief pause in the proceedings.) 
24 THE COURT: Okay. I am going to ask the other people 
25 in the courtroom to leave for just a minute while we discuss 
1 this issue. The statement says, "The lady in the audience is 
2 prompting the witness with head shakes the last ten minutes." 
3 I haven!t been observing anybody in the audience, so I can!t 
4 confirm that. Has anybody else been watching anybody in the 
5 audience and noticed anything? 
6 MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: I havenTt noticed anything. And 
7 that's always my concern when we get other people in the 
8 courtroom. I just wish the State would make me a decent offer 
9 in this case, and we could end it. 
10 THE COURT: Well, at this point, please have the 
11 victim coordinator and the mother come in. Okay. What the 
12 juror has said is, "The lady in the audience is prompting the 
13 witness with head shakes for the last ten minutes." 
14 THE MOTHER: I wasn't. 
15 THE COURT: Pardon? 
16 THE MOTHER: I wasn't. 
17 THE COURT: Were you? 
18 THE WITNESS COORDINATOR: No, sir. 
19 THE COURT: Were you observing — who are you, ma'am? 
20 THE MOTHER: I am his mother, Brandan's mother. 
21 THE COURT: Were you observing her at all? 
22 THE MOTHER: What? 
23 THE COURT: I am talking to the witness coordinator. 
24 THE WITNESS COORDINATOR: No, I am sorry, I wasn't. 
25 I was watching the victim, your Honor. 
1 THE COURT: Ms. Peters? 
2 1 MS. PETERS: I am not sure, because we werenTt 
3 looking back there. I think that might not even be relevant. 
4 It is relevant that thatfs what the juror feels he saw. But I 
5 am not sure what was happening behind me. They might not even 
6 realize they had done it. 
7 I THE COURT: Were you consciously prompting the 
8 witness? 
9 THE MOTHER: I don't — I wasnft there. I donft know 
10 what happened or how it happened. 
11 THE COURT: I am going to ask at this point that you 
12 leave here. I am not sure what happened here. But I don!t 
13 I believe that you should be in the audience at this point, 
14 I because an issue has been raised. I am not making any 
15 accusations at all. But I want to make sure this trial goes on 
16 with as little problem as can be possible. 
17 So we will call the jury back in, and we will proceed 
18 at this point. 
19 MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: Your Honor, can we ask them about 
20 that? Because that's a concern to me, as to what the other 
21 jurors saw or didn't see. 
22 THE COURT: What do you suggest? 
23 MS. PETERS: Rather than talking to all of the 
24 jurors, it didn't seem like all the jurors had a problem, if we 
25 are so inclined to speak to the jury, maybe speak to that one 
1 specific juror. 
2 MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: I think at this point, your 
3 Honor, I have a right to mention what happened in the 
4 courtroom, and it appeared that someone was prompting Brandan. 
5 I think I have a right to say that in the courtroom. 
6 THE COURT: Well, I am not sure you do at this point. 
7 That's your position. I understand that that's your position. 
8 MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: Because it was his observation. 
9 So I don't know if the rest of the jurors saw it or not. But I 
10 think I have a right to comment on that. Because I don't know 
11 what they are going to be talking about. 
12 THE COURT: I am not going to make a juror a witness 
13 here. That's just not going to happen. So you can't comment 
14 on anything that a juror told us that he saw, at this point. 
15 That's my ruling, and I know you take exception to it. That's 
16 on the record. 
17 MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: Are we going to ask the other 
18 jurors about anything? 
19 THE COURT: Well, that's a question. It appears to 
20 me that it is appropriate — I am concerned about going further 
21 into this than we have at this point. We have gotten an 
22 indication from one of the jurors that he perceived something 
23 which he understood as being prompting of a witness. Given 
24 I that, one of the jurors perceived that, we don't know how many 
25 ! others did, I think we have two options that I am willing to 
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consider at this point. One is to talk to that juror and tell 
him that he is not to consider anything done by any audience 
member as being germane, in terms of testimony; and that the 
jurors are to listen only to the testimony, and not take 
inferences from any gesture or facial expression that an 
attorney, party or audience member may make. 
MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: It would be my preference just to 
ask them if they noticed anything. They may not. And then 
just do a general instruction that they are not to take that 
into consideration. And I think that would cure it. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. NEILL: Your Honor, we would hate to ask all of 
the jurors. Obviously, none of us recognized or noticed it. 
THE COURT: Well, obviously, you didn't. 
MR. NEILL: And, I don't know, I have been paying 
attention to the jury a bit. They seem to be going back from 
the witness and the person asking the question. I hate to make 
it a bigger issue than it is with that potential — with that 
single juror. 
MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: The problem is we don't know if 
it is just a single juror issue, or if the rest of them noticed 
it, too. It is in their direct line of sight that they would 
see her. I am concerned about that, if the rest of them saw 
that. We can just ask them. If they say no, then we will just 
proceed with the jury instructions. 
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MR. NEILL: Your Honor, if I could respond, we 
believe it would pretty much taint the jury. That juror has, 
as he will be instructed, is to determine the credibility of a 
witness. If he observed something which he thinks attacks that 
credibility, that's his prerogative. But, as far as whether 
the other jurors — I think it goes to the credibility of the 
witness and the weight of the evidence. 
THE COURT: Mr. Neill, the concern I have is that we 
have had one juror who says he has observed such a thing. 
There certainly is the issue raised about whether other jurors 
observed such a thing, as well. It appears to me I am going to 
have to give some kind of an instruction to the jury as a 
whole, that they are to pay attention to the testimony, only; 
and gestures or any indication of agreement or disagreement or 
gestures from audience members, lawyers or anyone else is not 
evidence. It is not to be taken into consideration by them. 
I am not inclined to further emphasize the process by 
going through and talking to individual jurors, especially when 
I believe that the issue can be cured with an instruction. So 
I think we can call the jury in here, I will give them an 
instruction, and the instruction will be — give me a minute 
here, and I will write something out, and I will tell you what 
it is going to be, so you will understand what it is going to 
be. 
(A brief pause in the proceedings.) 
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THE COURT: Okay, "Jurors are to accept as evidence 
and rely on only testimony and other evidence presented in 
court. They may not consider gestures, facial expressions, or 
any other demonstration by lawyers, parties, or other persons 
present in the courtroom." 
MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: I would just ask that it be 
"other persons present in the courtroom." I think by putting 
"lawyers" first, it sounds like the lawyers were making some 
gestures. 
THE COURT: Okay, I will eliminate "lawyers" and 
"parties" from that. "Anyone present in the courtroom, other 
than the witness." 
MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: Well, but the only problem with 
this, your Honor, is that you are telling the juror to 
disregard what he saw, and he can't give any weight to what she 
was saying. 
THE COURT: I am going to tell you what you can do on 
this. You can question the witness about whether he saw any 
gestures from anybody in the courtroom. 
MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: Okay. He will say no. 
THE COURT: It seems to me that is the fairest way to 
deal with it. The issue here really is both the effect of this 
alleged activity on the witness — we don't know whether it 
happened or not — and on the juror. And I think that it 
can — that you can deal with that issue in that way. 
1 MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: Why donft we just forget the 
2 instruction, and that will just be my question. 
3 THE COURT: You can cross examine on that issue, and 
4 it resolves, in my view, the problem of trying to shape an 
5 instruction that would avoid the possible pitfalls. 
6 MR. NEILL: Your Honor, could we have the 
7 instruction, as well? 
8 THE COURT: I am not going to give it at this point. 
9 If we need to give it at the end of the evidence, then I will 
10 do that. If you can tell me a way to do it, that can avoid 
11 anything — for example, I believe witnesses can certainly look 
12 at a party, and observe his reactions to things. That's 
13 something that's normally done, and you don't tell them they 
14 can't do. Certainly, those kinds of things can be 
15 objectionable. I guess I will recover that. I think it 
16 probably is objectionable for a party to react to testimony. 
17 If someone raises an objection, I would have to tell the party 
18 not to react to the testimony, because in that way the party is 
19 testifying through gestures or expressions without being under 
20 oath and on the stand. 
21 The same thing for attorneys. Attorneys can't make 
22 gestures, can't make expressions. I know people do this, and 
23 it is the issue of when it becomes objectionable. People in an 
24 I audience will do that, as well. It happens in trials. In my 
25 ! view, it is not appropriate for anyone to be doing that in a 
1 courtroom. 
2 So I am willing to do that. It seems to me I can do 
3 it without suggesting that they are not to — that they are to 
4 accept — the jurors are to accept as evidence and rely on in 
5 their deliberations only testimony or other evidence presented 
6 in court. They may not consider gestures, facial expressions, 
7 or other demonstrations by anyone else present in the 
8 courtroom. Okay? And then I will allow you — 
9 MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: So you are going to give that? 
10 THE COURT: I am going to give that. 
11 MS. GUSTIN-FURGIS: Because the only concern is I 
12 think this juror should be able to consider that. I donTt 
13 think he should be instructed to disregard what he saw as 
14 prompting. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I agree with you to a certain 
16 extent. What I have stated, I believe to be the law. He can't 
17 rely on her saying anything for the truth of anything else. 
18 What I am going to allow you to do is to cross examine this 
19 witness in a — I will allow you to cross examine the witness, 
20 subject to objection, about whether he was prompted by anybody 
21 in the courtroom. And that seems to me to go to the issue you 
22 have raised about whether his testimony was affected. I don't 
23 think he can rely on anything she did there. She is not a 
24 witness, at least not at this point, and certainly not under 
25 these circumstances. That's what I am going to do. If there 
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are any other objections to this, other than what I have heard 
at this point. 
MR. NEILL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's bring the jurors back in, then. 
Before you bring the jury in, close the door just for one 
second. I didn't see what went on here. We have had this 
allegation. I don't know what happened with her. But I 
believe, to make sure that there is no hint of any further 
problem, that she should not be in the courtroom. I have asked 
her a pointed question. I am not making accusations about 
that. You understand what the process is here. 
MS. PETERS: Should we ask both of them to remain 
outside, and then just have Brandan come in? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(A brief pause in the proceedings.) 
THE COURT: We are ready to have the jury in. 
(The jury returned to the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. We are going to 
proceed now with cross examination, where we left off. Let me 
give you an instruction in between here. The jurors are not to 
accept as evidence or rely on in their deliberations — excuse 
me. Let me start again. Jurors are to accept as evidence and 
rely on in their deliberations only testimony and other 
evidence presented and accepted in court. They may not 
consider gestures, facial expressions, or any other 
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demonstration by any other person present in the courtroom. 
And we will now return to cross examination, 
Ms. Gustin-Furgis. 
Q (By Ms. Gustin-Furgis) Brandan, before we just took a 
break, there were two other people in the courtroom; is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And now they are not here anymore? 
A No. 
Q When I was asking you questions about this case, did 
you see anybody make gestures towards you? 
A No. 
Q You didn't see anybody prompting you to say a certain 
answer in a certain way? 
A What's prompting? Telling me to say something? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Anybody nodding? 
A No. 
Q Trying to alter your testimony? 
A I was looking at you. 
Q All right, well, I will just return. You stated that 
Karl walked you to the corner and knelt you down/ is that 
correct? 
A Yeah. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
BILLINGS. 
*1 Defendant appeals his convictions for 
aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnaping. 
First, Defendant argues the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a mistrial because of juror 
contact with court personnel. "[A] rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice arises from any 
unauthorized contact during a trial between 
witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors 
which goes beyond mere incidental, unintended, 
and brief contact." State v. Pike, 111 P.2d 277, 280 
(Utah 1985). 
In this case, one member of the jury overheard a 
bailiff in the courthouse yell "they are guilty." The 
bailiff who made the comment was operating the 
metal detectors at the court's entrance and was not 
assigned to the jury. When questioned by the trial 
court about the statement, the juror said that she 
was not sure who had made the remark, believed it 
was a joking comment, and did not understand it to 
pertain to any particular case. Further, the juror 
stated that it did not in any way interfere with her 
ability to be fair and impartial and she did not 
discuss it with any of the other jurors. 
Given the "incidental, unintended, and brief nature 
of the "contact," we do not think this is the type of 
contact which raises a presumption of prejudice. 
Certainly we cannot say that it had the "effect of 
breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly 
affect the juror's judgment as to credibility." Pike, 
712 P.2d at 281. Furthermore, given the "incidental, 
unintended, and brief nature of the contact, there is 
no appearance of impropriety and thus no 
deleterious effect upon the judicial process that 
would violate Pike. We therefore conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied Defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress an eyewitness 
identification. "The ultimate question to be 
determined is whether, under the totality of 
circumstances, the identification was reliable." State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991). In 
making this determination, the court must consider 
the following factors: 
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree of 
attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) 
the witness's capacity to observe the event, 
including his or her physical and mental acuity; 
(4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, 
or whether it was the product of suggestion; and 
(5) the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, 
remember and relate it correctly. 
Id. (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 
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(Utah 1986)). 
Defendant challenges the reliability of the 
identification under the first three factors, arguing 
that fear rendered the witness's perception 
unreliable and that his ability to see Defendant was 
obstructed. A comparison of the facts found by the 
trial court in this case with those upheld in Ramirez 
leads us to a different conclusion. 
*2 In Ramirez, the entire event occurred at night. 
See id. at 783. The length of time the witness 
viewed the defendant varied from seconds to a 
minute or longer from a distance of between ten to 
thirty feet. See id. at 782. The defendant wore a 
mask. See id. The witness perceived the defendant 
while the defendant threatened the witness with a 
gun and while the defendant's accomplice hit and 
threatened the witness with a pipe. See id. 
In this case, the eyewitness, victim Mitchell Lewis, 
had over two hours within which to view 
Defendant's unmasked face at the park, riding in the 
backseat of the car, and in the ravine in Big 
Cottonwood Canyon. The eyewitness sat next to 
Defendant in the ravine for an hour. Although 
Defendant wore dark sunglasses, Lewis could see 
his face behind them and noted Defendant's unusual 
blinking pattern. The trial court found that although 
Lewis was frightened, he was both "deliberate" and 
"thoughtful" in his approach to the situation, as he 
concentrated on observing and remembering 
Defendant's face and intentionally engaged 
Defendant in conversation. Additionally, as we have 
previously held, "we do not think the victim's 
ordinary fear is sufficient to defeat this factor. 
Otherwise, no victim of a violent crime could ever 
meet this factor." State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 227 
(Utah CtApp. 1998). 
Defendant next argues that under the fourth factor 
the identification was neither spontaneous nor 
consistent. However, Lewis provided the police 
with an accurate description of Defendant on the 
day of the kidnaping and robbery. Thereafter, Lewis 
consistently identified Defendant: at a photo array 
ten days after the incident; at a lineup 
approximately one month later; and finally at trial. 
While Defendant argues that Lewis originally 
omitted details of Defendant's description, the same 
bears on his credibility and does not render the 
identification inadmissible. See State v. Mincy, 838 
P.2d 648, 658 (Utah Ct.App.1992). 
Defendant further argues that under the fourth 
factor Lewis' identification was the product of 
impermissible suggestion. Defendant argues that 
because an officer told Lewis he had picked the 
right person out of the photo array, the subsequent 
lineup, where Lewis once again identified 
Defendant, was the product of impermissible 
suggestion. Again, a comparison with the facts 
upheld in Ramirez leads to a different conclusion. 
In Ramirez, police informed the eyewitness they 
had a suspect fitting the description he had provided 
them. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. The 
identification took place on the street in the middle 
of the night. See id. The eyewitness viewed the 
defendant from the back seat of a police car while 
the defendant, a dark-complexioned Apache Indian, 
was the only suspect, had his hands cuffed to a 
chain link fence behind his back, and had the 
headlights of several police cars on him. See id. 
Here, there was only a single comment made after 
the photo identification which was negated by a 
subsequent comment-that there was a possibility 
that the subject would not be in the lineup-before 
the lineup identification. 
*3 We conclude that under the totality of 
circumstances the eyewitness identification was 
sufficiently reliable. We therefore affirm. 
GREENWOOD, P.J., and JACKSON, Associate 
P.J., concur. 
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